front will permit me to do so." On July 13th, Beauregard, writing to Johnston, after sketching out a plan of offensive operations, says:[1] "Oh, that we had but one good head to conduct all our operations ! "We'are laboring, unfortunately, under the disadvantage of having about seven armies in the field, under as many independent commanders, which is contrary to the first principles of the art of war."[2] Both of these officers were able men, and, recognizing fully the superiority of the North in resources, they saw the possibility that each of them might be opposed by a superior Federal force. Hence they were anxious that a plan for combining their forces should be adopted, so that, together, they might be more than a match for the Federal army which they might select to strike, Beauregard was more enterprising than Johnston,—his mind was more fertile in suggestions,—he was continually urging the Government to adopt an aggressive policy. TluiB on June 12th, in the letter cited above/ he writes to Mr. Davis that, if Johnston were "to concentrate suddenly his forces" with his (BeauregaTa), they might retake Arlington Heights and Alexandria. Mr. Davis, however, did not consider thin suggestion practicable.[4]

On June 21st Major Whiting, of Johnston's staff,

writes to Beauregard, by Johnston's direction, that in

[1] Beauregard's *Mantissas,* 150.

[2] It is interesting to contrast this state of things with that which existed in the autumn of 1863, when General Lee with Longstreet's corps was on the Orange and Alexandria Railroad and Jackson with his own corps was in the Shenandoah Valley, but under Lee's orders. See 28 W. R., 696, 704, 705, 710, etc.

[3] Beauregard's *Manasms,* 148.

[4] 2 W. R., 922.